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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
past activity in a disloyal group bears a reasonable relationship to present
fitness for public office. If the court finds the relationship reasonable, past
loyalty oath statutes are valid as merely setting a standard. But if no reason-
able relationship is found, depriving a man of public office for past activity
in disloyal groups is punishment, and renders the statutes void as ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder.
ROBERT M. FAIR
INSURANCE - CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS - DIRECT
ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE COIIPANIES. - A, a resident of Texas, was in-
jured in an automobile accident in Louisiana through the negligence of B,
also a resident of Texas. A brought suit directly against B's insurance com-
pany, a Swiss corporation which had entered the insurance contract with B
in Texas. In similar situations Texas permits no direct action against an in-
surance company, but a Louisiana statute allows a direct action if the acci-
dent occurs in Louisiana, even though the policy may contain a provision
forbidding such action.1 The court held that the Louisiana statute could not
be applied to contracts consummated outside the state, without giving it
extra-territorial effect and depriving the insurer of its property without due
process of law. Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952).
Statutory attempts to deal with the problem of compensation for auto-
mobile accident victims have taken three main forms: (1) the enactment
of "Financial Responsibility Acts;" 2 (2) compulsory insurance require-
snents; 3 and (3) statutes permitting direct actions against insurers.4 The
1. La. Acts 1950, No. 541. "No policy or contract of liability insurance shall
be issued "or delivered in this state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured, shall not release the insurer from the payment
of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy,
and any judgment . . . against the insured for which the insurer is liable . . . shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the insured, and an action may
thereafter he maintained . . . against the insurer. The injured person . . . shall
have a right of direct action against the insurer . . . in the parish where the accident
oi injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said
action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the
insurer. . . . This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance
sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and whether
or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana .. "
2. Such laws usually contain provisions: (1) Requiring proof of financial respon-
sibility following a conviction of violation of certain motor vehicle laws. (2) Requiring
proof of financial responsibility following non-payment of a motor vehicle accident
judgment. (3) Suspending the right to operate a motor vehicle until satisfaction of
such judgment. Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 Law & Contemp. Prob.
505 (1936).
3. Massachusetts, first in this field provided in 1925, that no motor vehicle or
trailer could be registered unless an insurance company authorized to do business in
the state certified that a liability insurance policy had been issued covering the vehicle
in question. Braun, supra note 2, at 537. While compulsory insurance for all vehicles
is a rarity, many states require it for common carriers. N.D. Rev. Code 149-183.
(1943). The Statute expressly forbids joinder of the insurer in the action so as to expose
the fact of insurance to the jury. However, James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d
692, allowed such joinder under other statutes; cf. N.D. Rev. Code 328-0206 and
§28-0703 (1943).
4.. What Louisiana did by legislation other states have done by judicial inter-
pertation. Kansas treats an automobile liability policy as a third party beneficiary
contract creating a direct right against the insurer where the insured is a motor carrier;
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remedy of a direct action against the insurer where the insured proves in-
solvent or bankrupt has been provided in many states.5 The hardship to the
injured party is manifest in the situation which occurs when, after a judge-
ment against the negligent party has been returned unsatisfied because of his
insolvency, the injured party is left without redress because the insurance
policy provides for payment to the insured only after the insured has paid the
claim.( Statutes allowing a direct action against the insurance company in
the absence of the insured's insolvency or bankruptcy are more rare, and their
application and effect has created many unusual problems.
Louisiana first enacted a direct action statute in 1930, but by its terms
that statute was applicable only to contracts made within the state.7 That
such a statute is constitutional has been definitely settled.8 In 1950, however,
Louisiana amended its statute in an attempt to extend its force to all con-
tracts of insurance, regardless of where they were entered, so long as the acci-
dent occurred in Louisiana. o The instant case reiterates the decision of at
least one previous case that insofar as the statute attempts to govern contracts
made in other jurisdictions it is unconstitutional.10
The problem of adjudicating foreign contracts where the laws of the states
are in conflict is always a perplexing one, especially where the subject in-
volved is one as controversial as the right of direct action against an insurance
company. Most of the cases involving the direct action statute have been in-
stances where the suit was brought, on Louisiana insurance contracts in juris-
dictions forbidding direct actions against insurers. The primary question in-
volved in these cases has been whether the Louisiana statute was to be con-
sidered procedural or substantive by the forum, since if considered substan-
tive in character the statute should be applied by the forum while if consider-
ed procedural it would not be applicable." Recent decisions by the Louisiana
see, e.g., State Highway Commission v. American Mut. L. Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 187,
70 P.2d 20 (1937); Dunn v. Jones, 143 Kan. 218, 53 P.2d 918 (1936); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gentry, 191 Okla. 659, 132 P.2d 326 (1942). 'Wisconsin
allows joinder of the insurer openly in the trial court under a statute allowing joinder
of all parties having an interest in the controversy. Wis. Stats. §260.11 (1949).
This statute was construed to be procedural by a Minnesota court, Anderson v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946), so as not
to divest the insurer of his rights under the "no action" clause of the policy even
though the accident occurred in Wisconsin. In anqther case with identical facts (acci-
dent and contract in Wisconsin, suit brought in Minnesota) Minnesota however applied
Wisconsin law on the ground that the policy in question did not contain a "no action"
clause which could be enforced in Minnesota. Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591,
242 N.W. 329 (1932).
5. These statutes arose becaase of strict judicial enforcement of "no action"
clauses requiring actual payment of the claim by the insured before he in turn could
collect from the insurer and limiting the injured party's right of action to the insured
only. The technical difference between a policy of liability and one of indemnity
is important. The former gives rise to a cause of action as soon as the injury occurs,
the latter merely indemnifies the insured after he has satisfied the claim. 7 Apple-
man Ins. L. & P. §4261 (1942).
6. N.D. Rev. Code §39-1433 (1943).
7. La. Acts 1930, No. 55.
8. Lewis v. Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465 (1952) (no
expansion of jurisdiction of federal courts); Gager v. Teche Transfer Co., 143 So.
62 (La.App. 1932) (not an impairment of a contract); Rossville Com'l. Alcohol Corp. v.
Dennis Sheen Trans. Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (1931).
9. See note 1 supra.
10. Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
11. Wells v. American Employers Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1942)
(in a suit originally brought in Texas .the Federal court hel4 in a 2-1 decision that
the right to sue directly was procedural and Texas law governed).
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courts have. held the statute substantive in character, 12 although the 1930
statute had previously been held procedural by the Louisiana courts. 1  The
holding that the 1930 statute was procedural caused the Mississippi court,
which had at first applied the statute to local suits on Louisiana insurance
contracts," to reverse itself and refuse to apply the statute on the ground that
the Louisiana construction of the statute as procedural should be accepted as
binding.1 5 A not unlikely situation may be imagined in which a court, at-
tempting to apply a foreign action statute, might find that the courts of the
foreign state have declared their statute to be substantive while a local law
forbidding direct actions against insurance companies has been held proce-
dural. The court would appear to be confronted with two diametrically op-
posed rules, both equally binding.!6 In such a situation, the problem whether
the foreign statute is to be considered procedural or substantive would appear
soluble only by application of the law of the fornm, and this solution is the
one generally adopted.'7
An argument' used by some courts in applying the Louisiana direct action
statute even where it conflicts with local law is that the application of such a
statute does not violate the public policy of the forum.ls The possibility that
another state would refuse to apply a direct action statute on the grounds
of public policy would appear to be a consideration of rapidly decreasing
weight, since in the light of increasing legislation requiring compulsory in-
surance coverage of automobile drivers it may be presumed that juries in
most suits involving motor vehicle accidents proceed on the assumption that
insurance is present in the case."' However where the law of the forum ex-
pressly provided that the insurer's interest should not be exposed to the jury,
one court declared a direct action law violative of local public policy.20
The point of interest in the present case is to be found in the holding
that Louisiana's statute could not constitutionally be applied to the insurer
since the contract of insurance was entered in Texas and the rights arising
under it were therefore governed by Texas law. It may be pointed out that
the rule that contracts are governed by the lex loci contractus is simply one
of three rules which have been heretofore applied by courts in making a
choice of the law applicable to the construction of contracts.
2
'
12. Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. La.
1952); Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951);
West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).13. Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. 1936); Lowery v. Zorn, 157 So. 826
(La. 1934).
14. Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938)
(Mississippi court declared the Louisiana statute to be procedural).
15. MacArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939)
(construction of a statute by the state that enacted it is binding).
16. For the possibility of such a problem arising in North Dakota in applying a
Louisiana insurance policy see N.D. Rev. Code §39-1611 (Supp. 1949).
17. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1601 (1935).
18. Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930)
(Louisiana statute not repugnant to Mississippi public policy; see Restatement, Conflict of
Laws §612 (1934).
19. Since North Dakota now has a state Unsatisfied Judgment Fund providing
compensation for injured persons where the negligent driver is uninsured, the problem
seems of reduced significance. N.D. Rev. Code 139-1703 (Supp. 1949). The right
of recovery has been extended to cases where the negligent party causing the injury
is an unascertained 'lsit and run driver". N.D. Sess. L. 1951 c.258.
20. "Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indem. Co.. 316: Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946).
21 See. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1090 (1935'); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
321 (3rd ed. 1949).
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A second rule. enunciated is that the validity of contracts is governed by
the law the parties intended to govern.2 2 Under the third rule, the law of
the state contemplated as the place of perfornmiance governs. 23 In the instant
case it is arguable that the parties intended to be governed by the law of
the state where the insured contracted liability. Application of either of the
latter two rules might require a result different from that reached by this
court. However, the opinion rendered appears sound on principle. The rule
most generally accepted governs contracts according to the law of the place
where they are entered. This nile has the additional merits of simplicity and
certainty in most cases.
2 4
ROBERT H. LUNDBERG
INTERNAL REVENUE - DEPRECIATION - RIGHTS OF LIFE TENANTS TO
)EPRECIATE IMPROVEMENTS. - Petitioner and her husband entered into a
trust agreement whereby certain real property was conveyed as a gift in
trust to a daughter, subject to a life estate in themselves and the survivor.
Subsequently, after the death of her husband and at the age of 73, the
petitioner razed an unproductive building on the property and built a new
office building so that she might profit from her life estate. The useful life of
the building was 50 years and her life expectancy was then 7.26 years. Peti-
tioner claimed a deduction for depreciation based on her life expectancy in
her income tax returns. The Court of Appeals held that depreciation was to
be computed over the life of the property and not over the life expectancy
of the tenant for life, Penn v. Commissioner of Internal Reventw, 199 F.2d
210 (8th Cir. 1952).
Depreciation, a matter of legislative grace,' is allowed as a deduction
from gross income in determining the net taxable income.2 The allowance
applies only to property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer pro-
vided he has supplied the capital which has gone into the property. 3 A de-
22, This view has been reiected by text writers. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1079
(1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 325 (3rd ed. 1949); and by the courts, New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Cravens 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, 229 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W.2d 272 (1934).
23. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1086 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
324 (3rd ed., 1949).
24. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1090 (1935); see Note 16 A.L.R.2d 881, 890
(1951).
1. See Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Detroit Edison Co. %,. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
619, 622 (6th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) "Like all other deductions. the
allowance is a matter of legislative grace."
2. Int. Rev. Code §23 (1): "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions:
(1) Depreciation.-A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income."
3. City Nat. Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. App. 1938),
"The test is, can the cleimant, whatever his relationship to the property - as owner,
lessee, lessor, etc., - show a depreciating capital investment? The purpose of the
depreciation allowance is to permit a person whose money is invested to recover through
annual deduction an amount equal to the original outlay." See Weiss v. Weiner,
279 U.S. 333 (1929) (99 year lessee not permited to depreciate lessor's property);
see Century Electric .Co,, 15 T.C. 581, 585 (1950); Gladling Dry Goods Co., 2
B.T.A. 336, 338 (1925) (the important question is who made the investment to he
recovered over the period of depreciation).
